Gaining Comprehensive AIDS Treatment in South Africa: The Extraordinary ?Ordinary? by Friedman, S.
44
2 ·  Gaining comprehensive AIDS treatment in 
South Africa: the extraordinary ‘ordinary’
S T E V E N  F R I E D M A N
The fight for a comprehensive government response to HIV and AIDS 
has been one of the more significant sagas of post-apartheid South 
Africa – and one of the strangest. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
is justifiably seen as the clearest evidence thus far that citizen action can 
change policy in the new South African democracy. The ability of a coali-
tion of activists, opinion-formers and local and international civil society 
organizations to prompt the government to change a policy on HIV and 
AIDS which it had energetically defended seemed to confirm that citizen 
action could exert influence in post-apartheid South Africa.
The campaign to win comprehensive support for people living with 
AIDS can be judged a success: not only have tens of thousands of lives 
been saved, but progress in winning support within government created 
a platform for potential gains. The campaign pressed multinational 
companies to make medicine available at lower prices or to give up 
their right to exclusive supply in exchange for a royalty (Friedman and 
Mottiar 2004). It has also played a role in protecting people living with 
AIDS from violent victimization where they live. In various ways, the 
needs of people living with AIDS reached the consciousness of people 
in a position to do something about them in a manner which would 
not be conceivable without the campaign.
The campaign defied many routine assumptions of political analysis. 
Campaigns for policy change are generally needed when governments 
are divided from campaigners by differences in interest or ideology: the 
campaign can then be analysed as a process in which campaigners try 
to pressure or persuade political power-holders to revise their under-
standing of their interests. By contrast, the campaign for a change in 
South African government policy on HIV and AIDS was fought between a 
government and a coalition who were not divided by any noticeable dif-
ference of interest or value. The activists who led the fight for a change 
in policy had not been expecting to campaign against the government 
at all. Their intended targets were the multinational pharmaceutical 
companies which were expected to obstruct attempts to secure afford-
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able treatment for people living with the virus.' Since the government 
had passed a law allowing it to undercut their dominance of the market 
by importing cheaper medicines (TAC 2001), and since its own constitu-
ency is severely affected by the virus, it was expected to ally itself with 
the campaign for a comprehensive response to AIDS. Instead, it became 
its prime opponent. 
Despite its unusual character, the campaign has many features which 
help us understand how citizen action might achieve national policy 
change. This chapter discusses the campaign in the period 1998 to 
2007, its achievements and limits, and its implications for a clearer 
understanding of the obstacles and openings which face attempts by 
campaigners to alter national policy.( All descriptions of TAC structure 
and procedures date from 2007, when the research on which this chapter 
is based was conducted. At the time of writing, in 2009, the campaign 
continues.)
The Treatment Action Campaign: structure and governance
Launched in 1998, TAC was a response to the HIV and AIDS epi-
demic whose impact was becoming apparent: in 2002, 5 million South 
Africans were believed to be HIV positive (Directorate Health Systems 
Research 2002). TAC aimed to ‘campaign for greater access to treatment 
for all South Africans, by raising public awareness and understanding 
about issues surrounding the availability, affordability and use of HIV 
treatments’ (TAC 2007). Its founders were two former anti-apartheid 
activists, Zackie Achmat (who is HIV positive) and Mark Heywood; they 
sought to use the techniques developed in the fight against apartheid 
to press pharmaceutical firms to offer affordable medication to people 
living with AIDS.*
TAC employed a multi-strategy approach to campaigning, using 
methods ranging from civil disobedience and street demonstrations 
through action in the courts to measured pamphlets spelling out scien-
tific arguments. It was not only a campaigning organization: it also ran 
programmes which offer important services to its members, providing 
treatment and information. It also combined service provision with 
civil disobedience – in 2002, for example, it imported generics from 
Brazil, ignoring the patents held by pharmaceutical companies (Ness-
man 2002).
TAC is a membership organization; during the period of the re-
search, important aspects of its internal structure were unconventional. 
There was no clear-cut distinction between members and ‘supporters’, 
‘volun teers’ or ‘activists’,+ although membership – which was free – was 
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 relevant in the election of office bearers. Members elected the national 
executive, but social sectors – children, youth, faith-based organizations, 
healthcare professionals and trade unions – were also represented., In 
2005, membership was said to be around 12,000 (TAC 2005) but activists 
pointed out that the numbers participating in TAC marches – which 
they estimated at between 8,000 and 15,000 – indicated an ability to 
mobilize people well in excess of membership.- Most TAC members were 
women, which is unsurprising given that women are far more likely to 
be HIV positive (Department of Health 2002). They also appeared to be 
active participants, attending meetings in greater numbers than men 
and being more active in TAC activities.. 
Despite its unconventional approach to membership, TAC had a 
formal structure which provided for internal representative democracy. 
The basic unit was the branch. Each province in which it was active 
also had a provincial executive committee; its prime decision-making 
structure was the national executive committee. National leadership 
was nominated by branches and elected at a national congress every 
two years, where four national office bearers were also elected.
There was broad agreement within TAC that major strategic decisions 
were initiated by the national leadership, although some compromise 
between its view and that of other levels did seem evident. There were 
tensions between the national leadership and the provinces: ‘often there 
is resistance to national control: national has directed that all the treat-
ment literacy campaigns be run in the same way in all the provinces 
– but we here in Gauteng [Province] have some ideas of our own and 
are constantly voicing our need to do things our way’./These did not 
become a serious source of conflict. Finances were tightly controlled 
at the national level, a strategy justified on the grounds that it guards 
against wastage and corruption.
The fact that the national level took decisions was not in itself a sign 
that members lacked a say. Provinces and branches were consulted about 
strategies and tactics,'& but over-romantic views of internal democracy 
within TAC would be inappropriate. There were structural constraints 
to some expressions of democracy because some of TAC’s strategies 
required technical knowledge which was unavailable to grassroots mem-
bers lacking formal education. In some cases, concerns for financial 
probity may also have created constraints to internal democracy. It is 
almost inevitable that at times a divide emerges between, on the one 
hand, the small group of national officials whose formal education or 
political histories or both give them an inbuilt advantage in addressing 
technical and strategic issues and, on the other, the grass roots.
